Fractured 十字路口-法国大选何去何从?(下)

Fractured 十字路口-法国大选何去何从?(下)

文中英文部分来“经济学人”杂志。本译文是个体学习、欣赏语言的故,谢绝转载或用来其它商业用途。本人同意简书平台于接获有关著作权人的通报后,删除文章。

由我能力有限,错漏在所难免,随时欢迎批评指正。

弗朗索瓦·菲永简介,1954年3月生于法国右城市勒芒,是统治之人民运动联盟分子,具有公共法学和政治学博士学位。

1981年,他首次入选国民议会议员,是立极端青春的国会议员。

1993年3月,弗朗索瓦·菲永首破上法国政府,并当当局备受担纲高等教育与研讨部长。

2002年5月,菲永进入拉法兰政府,担任社会事务、劳工以及互助部长。他一致上任,就着手法国养老金制度改革。由于改革力度比较充分,他所行的改造为称之为“菲永改革”。

2005年5月底,离开内阁后,菲永积极支持萨科齐备战总统大选,成为萨科齐竞选总统被之“首席高参”,对萨科齐的入选居功至伟。

《金融时报》说,在左翼阵营看来,萨科齐的右翼团体受到,菲永是“最不腻”的平等员,他啊给视为萨科齐阵营的“鸽派”代表人物。

菲永以勇于改革以及擅长跟社会各界对话著称。他喜好文学,爱好登山运动,并针对赛车情有独钟。其所展示的《法兰西会承受真相》一写,颇为畅销。

菲永于法国议会上如:“我们要中国,世界为如因中国活动来经济衰退。”菲永还强调,西藏大凡炎黄版图的同等部分。

-信息来自网络。侵删。

政治学 1

The FN’s first base was in the south, where Mr Le Pen built support
among French settlers returning from independent Algeria in the 1970s.
Its second was the rust-belt of the north and east, where it scooped up
the disappointed vote that once went to socialists or communists. Maps
by Hervé Le Bras, a demographer, show that the FN now has a third home
in Mr Guilluy’s peripheral areas—beyond the outskirts of the cities, but
not deeply rural. In a ring of communes between 40km and 50km from the
centre of Paris, for example, the FN’s candidate in the 2015 regional
elections, Wallerand de Saint-Just, won 32% of the vote. In places 80km
out or more, he scored fully 41%

老百姓阵线的首先单根据地在南方,勒庞先生于20世纪70年份为阿尔及利亚独立返回法国底居住者中获了支撑。它的第二单根据地在北部和东部的‘’铁锈地带‘’,在那里曾投于社会党或共产党的选票由于受辜负而深受她们收入囊中。人口统计学家HervéLe
Bras的地图显示,国民阵线现在找到了第三独安家落户的四面八方,即Guilluy先生所谓的大面积地区-城市郊区之外,但与此同时未是深刻乡村的地方。比如,在距离巴黎市中心40及50公里的公社圈里,国民阵线候选人Wallerand
de
Saint-Just在2015年之所在选举被拿走了32%之选票。而于80公里要另行远之地方,他的得票率达到足够的41%。

Isolation boosts FN support. “The farther you live from a railway
station”, says Mr Le Bras, “the more you are likely to vote FN.” France
has high-quality public services,and its citizens have matching
expectations for the fabric of their lives. When that fabric thins—when
a local butcher closes, or a doctor leaves town—they feel neglect. A
common factor behind the FN vote in such places, says Jérôme Fourquet,
director of Ifop, is “a sense of abandonment, of being left behind by an
elite that doesn’t care.”

寂寞的水平助长了人民阵线支持率的升高。Le Bras先生说
“你离火车站去越远,就再起或投票被百姓阵线。”法国所有高质量的公共服务,其平民将想与活备受的织物等量齐观。当织物变薄时
-例如当一各类当地的刽子手关张,或者同一各项医生离开小镇 – 他们会当受忽略。
Ifop的毕竟监JérômeFourquet说,国民阵线在这些地方得选票背后一个并因素在由作用,那是千篇一律种“被放弃的感觉,被漠不体贴的才子抛弃的发。“

Ms Le Pen exploits this sentiment with uncanny skill. Born into politics
and raised in a mansion in a swish Parisian suburb, she somehow manages
to speak for those she calls the country’s “forgotten” in a way they
find credible. The reason this works is partly Ms Le Pen’s shrewd feel
for simple language and anti-elite slogans. But it is also because
France has been going through an unusually unsettled time that has left
people looking beyond the established parties and given French populism
distinctive features.

勒庞女士因为不可思议的技术借用了这种情绪。生于政治世家,长于时髦巴黎郊区的豪宅里的其,设法为它们口中的国度“被遗忘者”代言,以他们当可信的平等种办法。这个做法有效之由有是出于勒庞女士对简易的言语和倒精英口号精于世故的痛感。但为是盖法国直于经验之一个不行的不安定的时期,使得人们既定党派之外寻求解决方案,这与了法国民粹主义不同凡响之特色。

One is a sense that a great country, the cradle of human rights and the
Enlightenment, has somehow lost its way. This is particularly obvious in
economic terms. Since the end of the trente glorieuses, the three
decades of strong growth that followed the second world war, it has been
debt, rather than growth, that has financed the high-speed trains, the
blooming municipal flower beds and the generous provisions for child
care, ill health, job loss and old age that are the hallmark of France’s
splendid public sector. French public spending now accounts for a
greater share of GDP than it does in Sweden. But no French government
has balanced its budget since 1974.

那种英雄国家的觉得,人权摇篮和启蒙运动,已经有点不知所踪。这在经济方面更引人注目。从特伦特荣耀结束以来,(指二战以后三十年的精锐增长),是债务而未是提高,为高效火车,城市里放的花圃和慷慨之利(如孩子保育,生病医疗,失业和年长便于)提供了本,这是光辉灿烂的法国公共部门的表明。法国公共开支占GDP的份额比瑞典底还要好。但从1974年来说,没有一样到法国政府就平衡预算。

Les Trente Glorieuses (“The Glorious Thirty”) refers to the thirty
years from 1945-1975 following the end of the Second World War in
France. The name was first used by the French demographer Jean
Fourastié.

如上自:Wikipedia

Over the past 15 years, there has been a particular décrochage, or
decoupling, between the French economy and that of Germany, its closest
ally. In 2002 the two countries enjoyed comparable GDP per head.
Germany, under Gerhard Schröder, began to reform itself. France, under
Jacques Chirac, didn’t. Today, Germans have 17% more purchasing power
per person. Labour costs in France have risen faster than in Germany,
deterring the creation of permanent jobs and undermining
competitiveness. The country’s share of all goods exports between EU
countries has dropped from 13.4% to 10.5%.

当过去之15年里,法国经济以及它们极亲密无间的盟军德国的经济中发生了一个特地之解耦或分开之进程。在2002年,两国的人均GDP大体旗鼓相当。德国,在格哈特·施罗德治下(Gerhard
Schröder)开始改造自身。法国在雅克·希拉克(Jacques
Chirac)治生也从不召开同项事。今天,德国的人均购买力高了17%。法国之劳动力成本比较德国增强更快,这阻碍了旷日持久工作之生,并减弱了竞争力。在欧盟国家之间有着商品称遭遇法国底份额从13.4%低落到了10.5%。

Most devastating is unemployment. In 2002, it was a tad higher in
Germany. Today it has dropped to 4% on that side of the Rhine, but in
France it remains stuck at 10%, and at 25% for the under-25s. Over 80%
of new jobs are on short-term contracts, with “short-term” often meaning
just a month. A generation of young French people has grown up outside
the country’s famously protected job market. The votes for Mr Trump or
Brexit were weakest among the under 25s; but the young French support
the FN more than any other party. (Conversely, older voters have much
less truck with Ms Le Pen than their Anglophone peers did with Brexit
and Mr Trump; polls say they fear for their savings and pensions if
France leaves the euro.)

不过具破坏性的凡失业问题。在2002年,德国比法国有些强了好几。而今,莱茵河那里的失业率下降到了4%,但法国还维持以10%,25载以下则是25%。超过80%之初工作是短期合同,“短期”往往代表一个月。法国底年轻一代成长让国知名的受保障的就业市场外面。特朗普或英国脱欧收获支持之选票在25春秋以下是最少的;
但年轻的法国人口另行支持老百姓阵线而无是另外政党。
(相反地,更年长几的选民支持勒庞女士的多寡,比那些因为英文为母语的同龄人对脱欧或特朗普的支持而丢得多;
民意调查显示,如果法国距离欧元区,他们担心好的存及养老金。

Shame isn’t a strong enough emotion

光是耻还不够

Economic self-doubt has been compounded by a sense of what Laurent
Bouvet, a political scientist, calls “cultural insecurity”. Three big
terrorist attacks within the space of 18 months, in 2015 and 2016,
battered France’s confidence. The coming presidential election will be
conducted under a state of emergency which has been renewed four times
since November 2015. The French have had to learn to live with soldiers
patrolling the streets and railway stations, a daily visual reminder of
their vulnerability.

经济自怀疑是因为政治学家劳伦特·布维(Laurent
Bouvet)宣称的“文化无安全”感而转换得更错综复杂。
在2015年以及2016年,18个月时内发生的老三破大型恐怖袭击沉重打击了法国之信念。即将赶到的总统大选将当紧急状态下开展,自2015年11月以来已延长了季不好。法国丁只能学会忍受和街上,火车站巡逻士兵共同处的活。这种平凡的视觉冲击是对准她们脆弱性的同栽提醒。

Legitimate worries about terrorism have supplied fertile ground for
insidious identity politics. As the home to one of Europe’s biggest
Muslim minorities, France is more alert than, say, Italy or Spain to
hints of religious extremism. Moreover, the country has a pre-existing
and unforgiving framework for managing religious expression—known as
laïcité—which recent governments, fearing a threat to secularism, have
tightened up. When this provokes a row—over Muslim head-coverings,
say—it plays straight into Ms Le Pen’s hands; she has little trouble
persuading voters that their values are under threat. France, she tells
her flag-waving rallies, faces nothing less than “submersion”.

本着恐怖主义的成立担忧呢险的身份政治提供了沃土。
作为欧洲太可怜的穆斯林少数民族之一之家中,法国比较意大利或者西班牙尤其警觉宗教极端主义的征。
此外,该国有一个早已是而法不容情的宗教表达的管理框架 –
被称为政教分离(laïcité) –
最近,由于担心威胁及世俗主义,政府拿它们了得还困难了。
当这引起了争议,比如关于穆斯林头饰,它一直成放入勒庞女士手中的军火;
她几不消费吹灰之力就说服了选民,他们的观念在受到胁迫。
她告挥舞旗帜就规范的集会人群,法国不仅于面临“淹没”的流年。

Ms Le Pen succeeds not because of the way her policies, which include a
lower retirement age, more taxes on foreign workers and massive
increases in spending on the armed forces, would tackle economic
insecurity or the threat of terror (they wouldn’t). It is because of her
talent for blending two strands of populism: anti-immigrant talk about
values and churches, strong in the south, and anti-market discourse
about jobs and the system, favoured in the north. On both counts, she
can tap into French history.

勒庞女士成功的故不是盖她底策略将迎刃而解经济不安全要惧怕威胁(无济于事),这些政策包括于逊色之退休年龄,对外国工人证实还多税和大幅增军事的开销。而是其融合两道民粹主义的天然:反移民者谈论价值观同教会,他们以南部很有力;反对市场者讨论工作跟制度,则于北方大受欢迎。在当时点儿独面,她还好下法国史。

Ms Le Pen may have purged the FN of the overt anti-Semitism and neo-Nazi
imagery of her father’s era. Yet her party remains originally rooted in
a nostalgia for colonial Algeria and supporters of Marshal Pétain, who
collaborated with the Nazis. Churches, flags and the homeland remain
potent symbols in this world. Campaigning in Provence Ms Maréchal-Le Pen
frequently recalls the country’s roots in Christendom. At her aunt’s
political rallies, supporters can be heard chanting: “On est chez nous”
(This is our home).

勒庞女士可能就拿她生父时之明反犹主义和新纳粹图像于人民阵线中排除出去。然而,她的党政仍然还是植根于对阿尔及利亚殖民的怀旧之内容或者缘于于贝当元帅(曾跟纳粹合作)的维护者。在此世界里,教会,旗帜和家庭仍然是兵不血刃之表示。在普罗旺斯底竞选活动中,勒庞女士时想起起是国度之根本在基督教会。在它姑姑的政治会议上,支持者能听到颂歌:“On
est chez nous”(这是我们的家庭)。

At the same time, anti-establishment politics fits her compatriots’
self-image as a nation of revolutionaries, pitch forks in hand. When Mr
Le Pen was first elected to the National Assembly, in 1956, it was on a
list led by Pierre Poujade, who evoked this tradition when he spoke up
for “the little people”: “The downtrodden, the trashed, the ripped off,
the humiliated.” It is no coincidence that Ms Le Pen’s campaign slogan
is “In the name of the people”.

还要,反体制政治家身份很符合她当做一个国家的革命者的,手握紧杖叉的她同胞的由画像。1956年,当勒庞先生先是浅当选国民议会时,它在由皮埃尔·普贾德(Pierre
Poujade)领导的花名册及。,当他也“被超越,被抛,受欺骗,受侮辱“的“小人物”代言时,他逗了是传统。勒庞女士选择”以百姓之名义“为竞选口号不是巧合。

A final ingredient gives French populism a further twist:
Euroscepticism. Invaded three times by Germany since 1870, and on its
fifth republic, France has a long disrupted history, insecure even in
peace. After the second world war it dealt with this by building
Europe—a project by which it sought to bind in Germany and to amplify
its own power. The French regarded the ceding of sovereignty as a means
of reinforcing, not undermining, their nation state.

末了一种配料进一步转了法国的民粹主义:欧洲怀疑论。自1870年以来至第五共和国,德国侵略法国三次于,法国出一劳永逸中断的历史,甚至当和平时期也无安全。二战后,它经过建设欧洲之品类来缓解此难题

一个盘算绑定德国暨拓宽自己之力之项目。法国可以把主权上的折衷视为巩固其民族国家之手段而非是反。

Europe remains an important part of French identity. But somewhere along
the line the passion it once evoked cooled down, and the consensus
supporting it faltered. Second thoughts spread long before the recent
currency and refugee crises. In 1992, the French approved the launch of
the union’s single currency by the slimmest of margins. In 2005 they
rejected the draft EU constitution. The share of French people who see
Europe favourably dropped from 69% in 2004 to 38% in 2016, according to
Pew, a polling group; that makes the EU less popular in France than in
Britain. This has given the FN a fresh electoral cause. Ms Le Pen speaks
of Brexit as a model of emancipation from the shackles of what she calls
the “European Soviet Union”.

欧洲依然是法国身价的严重性片段。但是当及时漫长途径及腾飞之之一地方,它已经鼓舞的热情冷却下来,支持其的共识也变得步履蹒跚。改弦更张的想法在近期的币以及难民危机产生之前特别悠久就蔓延起来来了。1992年,法国只有因无限薄弱多数认可生产欧盟单一货币。2005年,他们拒绝了欧盟宪法草案。根据名义调查公司皮尤的数,法国口中视欧洲啊自己的比例由2004年之69%跌落至了2016年之38%。这令欧盟在法国甚至比在英国再度非给欢迎。这叫了人民阵线新的竞选理由。勒庞女士说到英国脱欧时说,这是挣脱她所谓的“欧洲苏维埃联盟”枷锁,得到翻身之规范。

The feeling that France has lost its sense of purpose goes well beyond
those tempted to vote for the FN. So does exasperation with the failures
of both the left and the right to put the national interest first, and
fix the country. At every national election for the past ten years, at
all levels of government, the French have voted against the party in
overall ower; fully 89% of the French told a recent poll they thought
the country was heading in the wrong direction. It is this that has
opened the way for a party refusenik such as Mr Macron—who,should he
win, will have to get the people to break their unerring habit of
resisting the change they have just voted for, a habit that accounts for
much of their frustration.

认为法国已经失去使命感的心绪远远大于了那些倾向于投票给老百姓阵线的心思。对于左,右两着失败的怒相比国家利益为预先,治理国家吗是这么。过去十年的各个一样交国家大选中,在朝之逐条圈,法国人还极力投票反对各党派;
最近一模一样糟糕民意测验表明整个89%之法国丁当国家走错了主旋律。正是以此因素吧拒绝党派的候选人,如马克龙先生打开了面。如果当选,他得被人民打破他们之但求无过,不乐意变革之惯,(变革正是她们投票希望得到的东西),这个习惯是选民等挫败感的显要原因。

In “Le Mal Français”, a book published in 1976, Alain Peyrefitte, a
minister under Charles de Gaulle, lamented the fact that such a talented
country had produced such a blocked system. Every now and then, it
seems, France needs to go through convulsions of abrupt change in order
to free itself from l’immobilisme (paralysis). History shows that such
moments of upheaval can produce startling and creative forces for
renewal. But they can also presage a slide into darkness. In Mr Macron’s
cities, and Ms Le Pen’s peripheries, France is poised to go either way.
The choice it makes could scarcely matter more.

以1976年出版的“Le MalFrançais”一书被,阿兰·佩耶菲特(Alain
Peyrefitte),戴高乐的一模一样号部长,哀叹这样一个出才情的国度来了这般一个梗的体制。
时不时地,似乎,法国急需经过突然更改引起的惊厥,把团结打瘫痪中脱身出来。
历史表明,这种巨变时刻好发惊人之与来创造性的力实现复兴;
但他们啊得预示着雷同跤滑入黑暗中。
在马克龙的城市要勒庞女士之广地区中,法国居于选择道路的十字路口。
它做出的选项无可知还要了。

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