Fractured 十字路口-法兰西大选何去何从?(下)政治学

Fractured 十字路口-法兰西大选何去何从?(下)政治学

文中国和英国文部分来源“经济学人”杂志。本译文是个体学习、欣赏语言之用,谢绝转发或用来其余商业用途。本人同意简书平台在接获有关作品权人的关照后,删除文章。

鉴于自家能力简单,错漏在所难免,随时欢迎批评指正。

弗朗索瓦·菲永简介,1954年十月出生于法国西边城市勒芒,是统治的人民运动联盟分子,具有公共医学和政治学博士学位。

1981年,他首次入选国民议会议员,是立即最青春的国会议员。

1993年1九月,弗朗索瓦·菲永首次进入法兰西共和国政党,并在政坛中担纲高等教育和商讨委员长。

2002年十一月,菲永进入拉法兰政党,担任社会事务、劳工和互助秘书长。他一上任,就入手法国养老金制度改进。由于改良力度较大,他所推行的改造被号称“菲永改良”。

二〇〇五年7月尾,离开内阁后,菲永积极帮忙萨科齐备战总统大选,成为萨科齐竞选总统中的“首席高参”,对萨科齐的当选劳苦功高。

《金融时报》说,在左翼阵营看来,萨科齐的右派团体中,菲永是“最不讨厌”的一位,他也被视为萨科齐阵营的“鸽派”代表人物。

菲永以勇于革新和擅长与社会各界对话著称。他欣赏文艺,爱好登山运动,并对赛车情有独钟。其所著的《法国可以接受真相》一书,颇为畅销。

菲永在高卢雄鸡议会上称:“我们须求中国,世界也要靠中国走出经济衰退。”菲永还强调,山东是中国领土的一部分。

-音讯来自互联网。侵删。

政治学 1

The FN’s first base was in the south, where Mr Le Pen built support
among French settlers returning from independent Algeria in the 1970s.
Its second was the rust-belt of the north and east, where it scooped up
the disappointed vote that once went to socialists or communists. Maps
by Hervé Le Bras, a demographer, show that the FN now has a third home
in Mr Guilluy’s peripheral areas—beyond the outskirts of the cities, but
not deeply rural. In a ring of communes between 40km and 50km from the
centre of Paris, for example, the FN’s candidate in the 2015 regional
elections, Wallerand de Saint-Just, won 32% of the vote. In places 80km
out or more, he scored fully 41%

人民阵线的率先个依照地在西部,勒庞先生在20世纪70年代因阿尔及乌鲁木齐单身重返法兰西的居民中获得了辅助。它的第一个按照地在西边和东边的‘’铁锈地带‘’,在那边已经投给社会党或共产党的选票由于被辜负而被她们收入私囊。人口总括学家HervéLe
Bras的地形图突显,国民阵线现在找到了第多少个安家落户的各处,即Guilluy先生所谓的周边地区-城市阜南县以外,但又不是浓厚乡村的地方。比如,在离开法国首都市焦点40至50海里的公社圈里,国民阵线候选人Wallerand
de
Saint-Just在二零一五年的地带选举中收获了32%的选票。而在80海里或更远的地点,他的得票率达到丰盛的41%。

Isolation boosts FN support. “The farther you live from a railway
station”, says Mr Le Bras, “the more you are likely to vote FN.” France
has high-quality public services,and its citizens have matching
expectations for the fabric of their lives. When that fabric thins—when
a local butcher closes, or a doctor leaves town—they feel neglect. A
common factor behind the FN vote in such places, says Jérôme Fourquet,
director of Ifop, is “a sense of abandonment, of being left behind by an
elite that doesn’t care.”

孤寂的品位助长了平民阵线襄助率的上涨。Le Bras先生说
“你离轻轨站距离越远,就更有可能投票给公民阵线。”高卢雄鸡有着高质量的公共服务,其平民将梦想和生存中的织物相提并论。当织物变薄时
-例如当一位本土的刽子手关张,或者一位医生离开小镇 – 他们会以为被忽视。
Ifop的总裁JérômeFourquet说,国民阵线在那几个地点获得选票背后一个联名因素在起效能,那是一种“被甩掉的痛感,被漠不爱戴的才女舍弃的感觉到。“

Ms Le Pen exploits this sentiment with uncanny skill. Born into politics
and raised in a mansion in a swish Parisian suburb, she somehow manages
to speak for those she calls the country’s “forgotten” in a way they
find credible. The reason this works is partly Ms Le Pen’s shrewd feel
for simple language and anti-elite slogans. But it is also because
France has been going through an unusually unsettled time that has left
people looking beyond the established parties and given French populism
distinctive features.

勒庞女士以不可捉摸的技能借用了那种情怀。生于政治世家,长于时尚法国首都瑶海区的豪宅里的他,设法为她口中的国家“被遗忘者”代言,以他们觉得可相信的一种办法。那么些做法有效的来底部分是由于勒庞女士对简易的言语和反精英口号精于世故的感觉到。但也是因为法兰西共和国直接在经历的一个非常的不安静的一时,使得人们既定党派之外寻求解决方案,那给予了法兰西民粹主义差距凡响的特色。

One is a sense that a great country, the cradle of human rights and the
Enlightenment, has somehow lost its way. This is particularly obvious in
economic terms. Since the end of the trente glorieuses, the three
decades of strong growth that followed the second world war, it has been
debt, rather than growth, that has financed the high-speed trains, the
blooming municipal flower beds and the generous provisions for child
care, ill health, job loss and old age that are the hallmark of France’s
splendid public sector. French public spending now accounts for a
greater share of GDP than it does in Sweden. But no French government
has balanced its budget since 1974.

那种英雄国家的感到,人权摇篮和启蒙运动,已经有点不知所踪。那在经济方面进一步鲜明。从特伦特荣誉截止以来,(指世界二战之后三十年的精锐增进),是债务而不是压实,为高速列车,城市里绽放的花坛和慷慨的便利(如小朋友保育,生病医疗,没有工作和年长便民)提供了财力,那是光辉灿烂的法兰西公共部门的阐明。法兰西公共费用占GDP的份额比瑞典的还要大。但自1974年的话,没有一届法兰西政党形成平衡预算。

Les Trente Glorieuses (“The Glorious Thirty”) refers to the thirty
years from 1945-1975 following the end of the Second World War in
France. The name was first used by the French demographer Jean
Fourastié.

上述来自:Wikipedia

政治学,Over the past 15 years, there has been a particular décrochage, or
decoupling, between the French economy and that of Germany, its closest
ally. In 2002 the two countries enjoyed comparable GDP per head.
Germany, under Gerhard Schröder, began to reform itself. France, under
Jacques Chirac, didn’t. Today, Germans have 17% more purchasing power
per person. Labour costs in France have risen faster than in Germany,
deterring the creation of permanent jobs and undermining
competitiveness. The country’s share of all goods exports between EU
countries has dropped from 13.4% to 10.5%.

在过去的15年里,法兰西经济和它最亲近的同盟国德意志联邦共和国的经济里面爆发了一个专程的解耦或分开的长河。在2002年,两国的人均GDP大体旗鼓出色。德意志联邦共和国,在格哈特·施罗德治下(Gerhard
Schröder)初步改造本身。高卢鸡在雅克·希拉克(Jacques
Chirac)治下却不曾做同样件事。今日,德意志联邦共和国的人均购买力高了17%。法兰西的劳力开销比德意志增强更快,那阻碍了许久工作的暴发,并减弱了竞争力。在欧盟国家里面有着商品出口中法国的份额从13.4%下落到了10.5%。

Most devastating is unemployment. In 2002, it was a tad higher in
Germany. Today it has dropped to 4% on that side of the Rhine, but in
France it remains stuck at 10%, and at 25% for the under-25s. Over 80%
of new jobs are on short-term contracts, with “short-term” often meaning
just a month. A generation of young French people has grown up outside
the country’s famously protected job market. The votes for Mr Trump or
Brexit were weakest among the under 25s; but the young French support
the FN more than any other party. (Conversely, older voters have much
less truck with Ms Le Pen than their Anglophone peers did with Brexit
and Mr Trump; polls say they fear for their savings and pensions if
France leaves the euro.)

最具破坏性的是失去工作难点。在2002年,德意志联邦共和国比法兰西共和国略高了好几。近期,多瑙河这里的失掉工作率下降到了4%,但高卢雄鸡仍然维持在10%,25岁以下则是25%。当先80%的新工作是短时间合同,“短时间”往往意味着一个月。高卢鸡的年轻一代成长于国家闻名的受有限帮助的就业市场之外。川普或U.K.脱欧拿走支持的选票在25岁以下是最少的;
但年轻的法兰西共和国人更辅助人民阵线而不是其它党政。
(相反地,更年长些的选民援救勒庞女士的数额,比这么些以英文为母语的同龄人对脱欧或川普的支撑要少得多;
民意调查展现,若是法兰西距离法郎区,他们操心自己的储贷和养老金。

Shame isn’t a strong enough emotion

只是羞愧还不够

Economic self-doubt has been compounded by a sense of what Laurent
Bouvet, a political scientist, calls “cultural insecurity”. Three big
terrorist attacks within the space of 18 months, in 2015 and 2016,
battered France’s confidence. The coming presidential election will be
conducted under a state of emergency which has been renewed four times
since November 2015. The French have had to learn to live with soldiers
patrolling the streets and railway stations, a daily visual reminder of
their vulnerability.

经济自身疑惑是因为政治学家Laurent·布维(LaurentBouvet)宣称的“文化不安全”感而变得进一步扑朔迷离。
在二〇一五年和二零一六年,1七个月时间内暴发的一次大型恐怖袭击沉重打击了法兰西的信念。即将赶到的总统大选将在殷切状态下举办,自二〇一五年12月以来已经延长了五次。法兰西人只能学会忍受和街道上,轻轨站巡逻士兵共处的生存。那种平凡的视觉冲击是对她们脆弱性的一种提示。

Legitimate worries about terrorism have supplied fertile ground for
insidious identity politics. As the home to one of Europe’s biggest
Muslim minorities, France is more alert than, say, Italy or Spain to
hints of religious extremism. Moreover, the country has a pre-existing
and unforgiving framework for managing religious expression—known as
laïcité—which recent governments, fearing a threat to secularism, have
tightened up. When this provokes a row—over Muslim head-coverings,
say—it plays straight into Ms Le Pen’s hands; she has little trouble
persuading voters that their values are under threat. France, she tells
her flag-waving rallies, faces nothing less than “submersion”.

对恐怖主义的客观担忧为阴险的地方政治提供了沃土。
作为亚洲最大的穆斯林少数民族之一的家中,法兰西比意国或西班牙王国(The Kingdom of Spain)越来越不容忽视宗教极端主义的迹象。
其它,该国有一个曾经存在而且法不容情的宗派表明的田间管理框架 –
被喻为政教分离(laïcité) –
如今,由于担心恐吓到世俗主义,政党把它收得更紧了。
当那引起了争议,比如关于穆斯林头饰,它一贯变成放入勒庞女士手中的军械;
她大概毫不费劲就说服了选民,他们的观念正在受到威胁。
她告诉挥舞旗帜那规范的议会人群,法兰西不仅于面临“淹没”的造化。

Ms Le Pen succeeds not because of the way her policies, which include a
lower retirement age, more taxes on foreign workers and massive
increases in spending on the armed forces, would tackle economic
insecurity or the threat of terror (they wouldn’t). It is because of her
talent for blending two strands of populism: anti-immigrant talk about
values and churches, strong in the south, and anti-market discourse
about jobs and the system, favoured in the north. On both counts, she
can tap into French history.

勒庞女士成功的来头不是因为他的方针将一蹴即至经济不安全或惧怕恐吓(无济于事),这个政策包罗较低的退休年龄,对国外工人征越来越多税和大幅增多阵容的花费。而是他融合两股民粹主义的后天性:反移民者谈论价值观和教会,他们在南方很强劲;反对市场者研商工作和社会制度,则在西部大受欢迎。在那个方面,她都足以采纳法兰西野史。

Ms Le Pen may have purged the FN of the overt anti-Semitism and neo-Nazi
imagery of her father’s era. Yet her party remains originally rooted in
a nostalgia for colonial Algeria and supporters of Marshal Pétain, who
collaborated with the Nazis. Churches, flags and the homeland remain
potent symbols in this world. Campaigning in Provence Ms Maréchal-Le Pen
frequently recalls the country’s roots in Christendom. At her aunt’s
political rallies, supporters can be heard chanting: “On est chez nous”
(This is our home).

勒庞女士可能早就把他生父时代的当众反犹主义和新纳粹图像从人民阵线中消除出去。但是,她的党政照旧或植根于对阿尔及波德戈里察殖民的怀旧之情或缘于于贝当元帅(曾与纳粹合作)的维护者。在那几个世界里,教会,旗帜和家园依然是强硬的表示。在普罗旺斯的竞选活动中,勒庞女士平日想起起这几个国家的根在于道教会。在他阿姨的政治集会上,支持者能听见颂歌:“On
est chez nous”(那是大家的家庭)。

At the same time, anti-establishment politics fits her compatriots’
self-image as a nation of revolutionaries, pitch forks in hand. When Mr
Le Pen was first elected to the National Assembly, in 1956, it was on a
list led by Pierre Poujade, who evoked this tradition when he spoke up
for “the little people”: “The downtrodden, the trashed, the ripped off,
the humiliated.” It is no coincidence that Ms Le Pen’s campaign slogan
is “In the name of the people”.

再就是,反体制外交家身份很适合她作为一个国家的革命者的,手持杖叉的他同胞的自画像。1956年,当勒庞先生先是次当选国民会议时,它在由皮埃尔·普Judd(Pierre
Poujade)领导的名单上。,当他为“被过量,被甩掉,受欺骗,受侮辱“的“小人物”代言时,他挑起了那么些观念。勒庞女士挑选”以公民的名义“为竞选口号不是偶合。

A final ingredient gives French populism a further twist:
Euroscepticism. Invaded three times by Germany since 1870, and on its
fifth republic, France has a long disrupted history, insecure even in
peace. After the second world war it dealt with this by building
Europe—a project by which it sought to bind in Germany and to amplify
its own power. The French regarded the ceding of sovereignty as a means
of reinforcing, not undermining, their nation state.

末尾一种配料进一步扭曲了法兰西的民粹主义:北美洲狐疑论。自1870年来说到第五共和国,德意志侵略法兰西共和国一遍,法兰西共和国有久远中断的历史,甚至在和日常期也不安全。世界世界二战后,它通过建设欧洲的档次来缓解这几个难点

一个试图绑定德意志和拓宽自己的能力的项目。法兰西可以把主权上的低头视为巩固其民族国家的伎俩而不是倒转。

Europe remains an important part of French identity. But somewhere along
the line the passion it once evoked cooled down, and the consensus
supporting it faltered. Second thoughts spread long before the recent
currency and refugee crises. In 1992, the French approved the launch of
the union’s single currency by the slimmest of margins. In 2005 they
rejected the draft EU constitution. The share of French people who see
Europe favourably dropped from 69% in 2004 to 38% in 2016, according to
Pew, a polling group; that makes the EU less popular in France than in
Britain. This has given the FN a fresh electoral cause. Ms Le Pen speaks
of Brexit as a model of emancipation from the shackles of what she calls
the “European Soviet Union”.

亚洲仍然是法兰西身份的机要组成部分。不过在那条途径上进步的某个地方,它曾经鼓舞的热心冷却下来,帮助它的共识也变得步履蹒跚。改弦更张的想法在近年来的钱币和难民危害发生此前很久就蔓延开来了。1992年,法兰西仅以最薄弱多数获准生产欧盟单一货币。二〇〇五年,他们拒绝了欧盟民法通则草案。依照名义调查集团皮尤的数目,法兰西总人口中视南美洲为协调的比重从二〇〇四年的69%骤降到了二零一六年的38%。那使得欧盟在法兰西竟然比在大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国更不受欢迎。那给了平民阵线新的竞选理由。勒庞女士谈到英帝国脱欧时说,那是挣脱她所谓的“澳大利亚联邦(Commonwealth of Australia)苏维埃联盟”枷锁,得到翻身的规范。

The feeling that France has lost its sense of purpose goes well beyond
those tempted to vote for the FN. So does exasperation with the failures
of both the left and the right to put the national interest first, and
fix the country. At every national election for the past ten years, at
all levels of government, the French have voted against the party in
overall ower; fully 89% of the French told a recent poll they thought
the country was heading in the wrong direction. It is this that has
opened the way for a party refusenik such as Mr Macron—who,should he
win, will have to get the people to break their unerring habit of
resisting the change they have just voted for, a habit that accounts for
much of their frustration.

觉得法兰西已失去任务感的心理远远当先了那些倾向于投票给公民阵线的情感。对于左,右两派败北的义愤比较国家利益为先,治理国家也是那样。过去十年的每一届国家大选中,在当局的一一层面,高卢雄鸡人都全力以赴投票反对各党派;
如今三遍民意测验注解整个89%的高卢鸡人觉着国家走错了主旋律。正是这几个因素为拒绝党派的候选人,如马克龙先生打开了规模。假设当选,他必须令人民打破他们的比上不足,不愿变革的习惯,(变革正是他们投票希望得到的东西),那么些习惯是选民们挫败感的紧要性原因。

In “Le Mal Français”, a book published in 1976, Alain Peyrefitte, a
minister under Charles de Gaulle, lamented the fact that such a talented
country had produced such a blocked system. Every now and then, it
seems, France needs to go through convulsions of abrupt change in order
to free itself from l’immobilisme (paralysis). History shows that such
moments of upheaval can produce startling and creative forces for
renewal. But they can also presage a slide into darkness. In Mr Macron’s
cities, and Ms Le Pen’s peripheries, France is poised to go either way.
The choice it makes could scarcely matter more.

在1976年出版的“Le MalFrançais”一书中,阿兰·佩耶菲特(Alain
Peyrefitte),戴高乐的一位院长,哀叹那样一个有才华的国度暴发了这么一个堵塞的样式。
时不时地,如同,法兰西共和国急需通过突然更改引起的惊厥,把团结从瘫痪中解脱出来。
历史申明,那种巨变时刻可以生出惊人的和有创建性的能力落成复兴;
但他们也可以预示着一跤滑入乌黑之中。
在马克龙的城市或勒庞女士的周边地区时期,法国处在选拔道路的十字路口。
它做出的选项不可能更关键了。

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